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Whiteness as Audition and Blackness as Performance: 
Status Protest from the Margin 
John O. Calmore* 
Most talk by whites about equal opportunity seems to me now 
to be about equal opportunity to try to get into a position of 
dominance while denying that systems of dominance exist. 
—Peggy McIntosh1 
If race is something about which we dare not speak in polite 
social company, the same cannot be said of the viewing of 
race. How, or whether, blacks are seen depends upon a 
dynamic of display that ricochets between hypervisibility and 
oblivion. . . . If, moreover, the real lives of real blacks unfold 
outside the view of many whites, the fantasy of black life as a 
theatrical enterprise is an almost obsessive indulgence. 
—Patricia Williams2 
 * Reef C. Ivey II Research Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill. This essay is adapted from a work in progress. See JOHN O. CALMORE, RANDOM NOTES 
OF AN INTEGRATION WARRIOR (forthcoming 2006). I want to acknowledge the exemplary 
research assistance from Kelly Black-Oliver, Carolina Law, Class of 2005. 
 I also thank Barbara Flagg for inviting me to participate in the conference, “Whiteness: 
Some Critical Perspectives.” Held at Washington University School of Law, October 29, 2004, 
with spectacular presentations, the conference more than lived up to its billing: “[This] 
interdisciplinary conference [will] explor[e] the ways whiteness and white privilege create, 
entrench, and reproduce themselves. Conference presenters include leading scholars in the field 
of Critical Race Theory and Whiteness studies, from the disciplines of history, law, and 
sociology.” See Washington University in St. Louis School of Law, Whiteness: Some Critical 
Perspectives (Oct. 29, 2004), at http://law.wustl.edu/Whatsnew/Fall2004/Conferences/ 
whiteness_Oct_29.html. 
 1. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming 
to See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies, in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: 
A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 32, 32–33 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995). 
 2. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR-BLIND FUTURE: THE PARADOX OF RACE 17 
(1997). 
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You can’t explain to Whites what they can’t see. 
—A Latina law student, University of Michigan3 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay responds to the introductory epigraphs. It seeks to 
make visible a white social identity that presents itself as abstract 
individualism while masking its support from systems of dominance. 
Against this hidden connection, blacks must not only represent our 
reality, but also advocate on its behalf to bring some balance to a 
form of dominant white voyeurism that places us in the ricocheting 
tension “between hypervisibility and oblivion.”4 Finally, I hope that 
my personal story provides an illustration of racialized experience 
that performs identity beyond this voyeurism and beyond what many 
whites cannot, or will not, see. In short, this essay addresses 
racialized identity (blackness) as performance and whiteness as 
audition.5 Moreover, as a marginal man, I view my marginality as a 
positive position from which to launch a status protest. 
As sociologist Howard Winant points out, common approaches to 
the study of race have displayed “an insufficient appreciation of the 
performative aspect of race.”6 In looking at the performance of race, 
moreover, as Sarah Susannah Willie’s study shows we gain a better 
appreciation of how race is “defined by both subject and situation.”7 
 3. Walter R. Allen & Daniel Solόrzano, Affirmative Action, Educational Equity and 
Campus Racial Climate, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 237, 277 (2001). 
 4. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 17. 
 5. See generally Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1134, 1139 (2004) (“Race/ethnicity performance is defined as any behavior or 
voluntarily displayed attribute which, by accident or design, communicates racial or ethnic 
identity or status.”). Among legal scholars, Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati also provide 
important discussions of racial performance, particularly in the employment context. Devon W. 
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000); Devon W. 
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 
1771–72 (2003). Performing race makes racial identity operational in a self-conscious way. It is 
closely related, certainly, to racial identity development. See generally BEVERLY DANIEL 
TATUM, “WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER IN THE CAFETERIA?” AND 
OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE 54–59, 75–80 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 6. HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL CONDITIONS: POLITICS, THEORY, COMPARISONS 18 
(1994). 
 7. SARAH SUSANNAH WILLIE, ACTING BLACK: COLLEGE, IDENTITY, AND THE 
PERFORMANCE OF RACE 7 (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol18/iss1/6
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Thus, context becomes a key focus point. In Willie’s study of black 
alumni from Northwestern and Howard universities, she found that 
race was highly malleable and contingent. Her subjects reflected this 
through their descriptions of the ways they consciously acted white in 
certain settings and acted black in others. According to Willie: 
Although they saw themselves as black, that did not mean they 
understood blackness as something simple or simplistic. The 
people with whom I spoke treated race as sets of behaviors 
that they could choose to act out, as expectations they had of 
themselves and others, as physical difference, and as ethnicity 
and subculture. Consciously negotiating their identities, even 
when there was sometimes very little room to do so, the men 
and women in this study described performing.8 
Acting black for me, however, is not a matter of vacillating from 
acting white to black in certain settings. I seek constancy, though I 
adjust to settings where my acting black defies conventional 
expectations and stereotypes but does not entail acting white. At this 
margin, strange though it may appear, sometimes acting black must 
be performed in personally unprecedented circumstances, 
representing a new experience even for the actor. When this is the 
case, life is not merely a script; it is often an improvisation. The 
performance of identity thus must be nimble and open to constant 
change. As Homi Bhabha says, “the question of identification is 
never the affirmation of a pregiven identity, never a self-fulfilling 
prophecy—it is always the production of an image of identity and the 
transformation of the subject in assuming that image.”9 
Non-white performance in a dominantly white setting has been a 
historical predicament. From 1790 to 1952, whiteness was a 
prerequisite for naturalized citizenship.10 From the first racial 
prerequisite case in 1878, a total of fifty-two cases were brought 
before such racial restrictions were eliminated in 1952.11 In these 
 8. Id. at 5. 
 9. Homi K. Bhabha, Interrogating Identity: The Postcolonial Prerogative, in ANATOMY 
OF RACISM 183, 188 (David Theo Goldberg ed., 1990). 
 10. IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 1 
(1996). 
 11. Id. at 4. For a list of cases, see id. at 203 app. A. 
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cases, immigrant applications for citizenship were assessed in terms 
of whether the applicant could perform whiteness.12 Indeed, the rights 
enjoyed by white males could only be obtained through assimilatory 
behavior.13 Under these circumstances, in social contract terms, white 
performance was the quid pro quo for white privilege.14 Today, this is 
still largely the quid pro quo, but this is a bad bargain for people of 
color.  
In 1992, I wrote an article about the jazz saxophonist Archie 
Shepp in which I associated his “fire music” with critical race 
theory.15 In that article, I wrote something that is still pertinent: “As a 
form of oppositional scholarship, critical race theory challenges the 
universality of [combined] white experience [and] judgment as the 
authoritative standard that binds people of color and normatively 
measures, directs, controls, and regulates the terms of proper thought, 
expression, presentment, and behavior.”16 This essay is an extension 
of that earlier observation. 
In focusing on the relational identities of black and white, I 
traverse the complex ground where identity and subjectivity 
interrelate. Julie Matthews points out that, “while ‘identity’ and 
‘subjectivity’ are often used interchangeably, in contemporary social 
theory ‘identity’ refers to the recognition of a person or thing. It is a 
strategic and relational entity that is ‘marked out’ by symbols and 
does not signal a stable core of the self.”17 In performing identity, 
recognition by others often includes a deployment of “marked-out” 
symbols that undergird the process of audition. For me, the self-
recognition aspect of performing identity is race-consciously 
subjective, where “[s]ubjectivity demarcates the site of feeling and 
 12. Id. at 3 (“[T]he courts were responsible for deciding not only who was White, but why 
someone was White.”). 
 13. John Tehranian, Note, Performing Whiteness: Naturalization Litigation and the 
Construction of Racial Identity in America, 109 YALE L.J. 817, 821 (2000). 
 14. Id. 
 15. John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an 
Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992). 
 16. Id. at 2160. 
 17. Julie Matthews, Deconstructing the Visual: The Diasporic Hybridity of Asian and 
Eurasian Female Images, 8 INTERSECTIONS n.55 (Oct. 2002), available at http://wwwsshe. 
murdoch.edu.au/intersections/issue8/matthews.html. 
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consciousness.”18 As Matthews elaborates, subjectivity, in 
contemporary usage, “does not signal a unitary identity or source of 
agency, but a consciousness determined, regulated and produced by 
social relations and language.”19 Accordingly, I will explore what 
whiteness means to me as a black man; what it means not only as a 
concept, but also as an operational influence in the performance of 
my own racial identity. Race consciousness is my springboard.20  
Thus introduced, this essay proceeds in four parts. Part I examines 
the audition frame of dominant, standard-bearing whiteness as it 
subjects black identity to perform against a backdrop of white 
narratives that portray oppositional dualities of representation where 
white images are positive and black images are negative. Here, 
individually holding white privilege may appear to be benign, but 
that privilege is not held independently of group-based white 
supremacy, dominance, and power. Part II discusses the operation of 
a racialized identity that implores blacks to re-invent themselves as 
they perform within a framework of whiteness as audition. This 
performance often places blacks at the margin of dominant society’s 
expectations. Part III incorporates the sociological analyses of Robert 
Park, Everett Stonequist, and Everett Hughes in discussing 
performance as a status protest rather than as accommodation, 
assimilation, or retreat. Under my analysis, marginality is translated 
into a positive orientation. Finally, Part IV looks at black identity’s 
diversity within itself, raising the issue whether dominant society is 
inclined to subordinate African-Americans and, at their expense, 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. According to the National Research Council, race consciousness among blacks 
involves four features:  
One, a feeling of closeness or identification with other group members; two, a 
dissatisfaction with group status, especially in the political arena; three, an attribution 
of the unsatisfactory group status to illegitimate causes such as discrimination; and 
four, a belief that group members must act collectively to improve the group’s 
position. 
A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 236 (Gerald David Jaynes & Robin 
M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989). When I say that I am a race man, or when I say that I am race 
conscious, I am primarily race conscious in these four respects. Now, often against an acute 
backdrop of race consciousness but in deference to whiteness, my black identity is performed 
incognito. 
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reward those blacks who are not descendants of slaves. Self-
conscious adoption of a diaspora identity may help blacks to 
transcend intra-group conflicts and establish common operational 
grounds based on our collective hybridity. 
I. DOMINANT WHITENESS AND IDENTITY PERFORMANCE: 
THE AUDITION FRAME 
Whiteness, as a category and as a social construct of racial 
identity, is a chameleon. While it does not literally change its color, 
the meaning and significance of whiteness varies over time and 
space.21 The variations may run from a simple whiteness to a 
complex whiteness; from a transparent whiteness to a self-
consciously bonding whiteness; from an unnoticed whiteness of 
atomized, individual privilege to a whiteness of group position that is 
secured by a system of racial supremacy and domination.22  
Within this great variety of whiteness, I would guess that for most 
people of color, whiteness is never viewed as simple, transparent, or 
benignly individualized. This brings me to a particular whiteness that 
I call “problematical whiteness”—whiteness in the way, whiteness on 
the back. Not all whiteness is problematical, but when it is, I see it 
and experience it as the “interlocking pattern” and “embedded 
systems” that Elena Feartherston and Jean Ishibashi describe in the 
following terms: 
Whiteness must be recognized and acknowledged as more than 
color. Whiteness is an interlocking pattern of beliefs, values, 
feelings, and assumptions; policies, procedures, and laws; 
 21. As Duncan Kennedy observes, “[w]e need to conceptualize groups in a ‘post-modern’ 
way, recognizing their reality in our lives without losing sight of the partial, unstable, 
contradictory character of group existence.” Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for 
Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 705 (1990) (footnote omitted). 
 22. Ruth Frankenberg defines “whiteness” as the cumulative way that race shapes the 
lives of white people. See RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS 1 (1993). For various treatments of the topic, see BARBARA 
FLAGG, I WAS BLIND BUT NOW I SEE (1998); TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: 
WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION (1992); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF 
WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991); STEPHANIE 
M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 
(1996). 
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behaviors and unwritten rules used to define and underpin a 
worldview. It is embedded in historic systems of oppression 
that sustain wealth, power, and privilege.23  
When I speak of the whiteness that I most often must take into 
account, I am referring specifically to this problematical whiteness.  
Whites tend to disassociate themselves from problematical 
whiteness, even though their group history, membership, and position 
make such disassociation virtually impossible. While the attempt to 
disassociate may be made in good faith, it fails because whites 
generally are caught up in histories, socializations, systems, and 
structures that defeat the best of intentions.24 Being caught up in these 
terms is not inevitable; it is simply not on most whites’ agenda to 
break free.  
Whiteness in these problematical terms is mostly a constant 
audition, or “a trial performance to appraise . . . [my] merits,”25 in my 
quest for acceptance, dignity, respect, and material reward. As I 
performed my identity under the pressures of the ever-present white 
(dominant) critical hearing, I used to struggle with attempting to get 
whites to give up the center. Although the spotlight is on the 
performer, the power of appraisal is at the center. As I mature, I have 
come to embrace, rather than reject or circumvent, my status as a 
“marginal man”—a status that enables me to negotiate a white-biased 
world and that, more importantly, keeps me sane.26 
In looking at the black performance of identity on the stage of 
whiteness, a focus on white privilege alone half-steps. White 
privilege does not exist and operate independently of white 
supremacy, dominance, and power. White individuals do not go 
through life without the benefit of historical, systemic, cultural, and 
institutional advantage. The almost inescapable attributes of 
whiteness—privilege, supremacy, dominance, and power—are the 
 23. Elena Featherston & Jean Ishibashi, Oreos and Bananas: Conversations on Whiteness, 
in IDENTIFYING RACE AND TRANSFORMING WHITENESS IN THE CLASSROOM 87, 105 (Virginia 
Lea & Judy Helfand eds., 2004). 
 24. FRANKENBERG, supra note 22, at 242–43. 
 25. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 
UNABRIDGED 143 (Merriam-Webster ed., 1993). 
 26. See infra Part III. 
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cornerstones of the interlocking patterns and systems of 
subordination that create, maintain, and perpetuate the white racisms 
of the day. This holds true regardless of whether those racisms are 
currently designed or historically perpetrated, whether they are 
intentionally directed or “just the way it is” in a color-blind society 
that is making “racial progress.” 
Standard-bearing whiteness is relational from the universal, top-
down, and center. Auditioning blackness is relational from the 
particular, bottom-up, and outside-in. Performing identity from these 
different positions and perspectives is a remarkably different 
experience. White advantage and black disadvantage are too often 
discounted when considering the process and result of racial-identity 
performance. I suspect that many whites would counter-argue that 
white advantage and black disadvantage are too often inflated. This 
argument makes accountability difficult. For instance, I have heard 
stories about white mothers complaining of affirmative action’s 
unfairness. These mothers explain that if their daughters could simply 
mark a black racial box on their college applications, it would 
“greatly improve” their chances of being admitted. In hearing this 
rather common lament, I wonder: if the daughters had marked the 
black box on their birth certificate and lived as black daughters up to 
the time of applying to college, would that experience “greatly 
improve” their chances of getting into college? 
When I look in the mirror, and even more-so when I step into the 
world in which I live, I see whiteness operating as a coercive 
intervention. Thus, dominant whiteness is not a free-floating identity. 
It really is not an individual identity at all. As I have mentioned, 
while many well-intentioned whites disassociate themselves from 
dominant whiteness, few can insulate themselves from its influence. 
Unfortunately, few people of color can insulate themselves from its 
influence either. 
The hierarchy established by dominant whiteness incorporates 
historical, oppositional dualities. These dualities contrast white 
images with black images. A list of oppositional dualities illustrates 
how racialized narratives are used to articulate invidious distinctions 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol18/iss1/6
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of blacks as the inferior other.27 Herein lies the rub: dominant 
whiteness, a structured, systemic, and group-based phenomenon, 
masquerades within the social construction of individualized, 
atomized, and everyday whiteness. Melanie Bush, for example, 
demonstrates how these narratives not only present oppositional 
images, but also apply different standards to different racial groups, 
allowing whites to be seen as individuals while people of color are 
seen as representatives of their race.28 She provides this list of polar 
opposites of black/white terminology:  
• Whites don’t murder, steal, speed, or take drugs; Blacks do 
them all. 
• Whites are generous; Blacks want more than their fair share.  
• Whites are patient and work hard; Blacks are lazy and like to 
complain.  
• Whites are good; Blacks are bad; Latinos and Asians are 
invisible, in-between, and homogenous.  
• Whites are inclusive and reach out to all; Blacks are 
exclusive and self-segregate.  
• Whites are objective; Blacks exaggerate.  
• Whites are peaceful; Blacks are violent.  
• Whites hire by ability; Blacks hire by race.  
• Whites vote by issue; Blacks vote by race.  
• Whites are in positions of authority; Blacks are subordinate.  
• Whites can’t make “Black” jokes; Blacks can make “white” 
jokes.  
• Whites are philanthropic; Blacks are activists.  
• Whites run society, and don’t have time to complain, or to 
fight injustice; Blacks waste time whining rather than doing 
the “real work.”  
• Whites are realistic; Blacks are idealistic.  
 27. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, in CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 103, 112–13 (Kimberlé 
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (discussing these dualities as part of the hegemonic role of racism in 
establishing the other in American ideology). 
 28. MELANIE E. L. BUSH, BREAKING THE CODE OF GOOD INTENTIONS: EVERYDAY 
FORMS OF WHITENESS 225 (2004). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p  99 Calmore book pages.doc  10/18/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 18:99 
 
 
 
• Of Whites, Italians and Jews appear mixed or “different”; all 
Blacks look alike. 
• Whites are orderly and safe; Blacks are rowdy and 
dangerous.  
• Whites are authentic and honest; Blacks are phony and 
manipulative.  
• Whites succeed on their own; Blacks need help.  
• Whites are moral; Blacks are immoral.29  
These dominant narratives communicate through discrete and 
implicit imagery and discourse. Let us examine how dominant 
whiteness operates in this context. According to Bush: 
The centering of whiteness gives whites significant and 
positive unearned advantage while it marginalizes, vilifies, and 
objectifies Blacks, Latinos, and Asians, reflecting a differential 
valuation of these groups. The implicit moral presumptions of 
white as superior and people of color as inferior emerged 
repeatedly as whites described themselves as multicultural, 
realistic, relevant, open-minded, caring, educated, and honest, 
in contrast to people of color, who were characterized as self-
centered, unrealistic, irrelevant, close-minded, selfish, and 
dishonest.30 
As a professional, affluent black man, I inhabit the tension 
between these images, never fully presenting the positive ones and 
never fully free of the negative ones. As a successful black male 
journalist remarked, “[t]o almost all cops and most of society, I am a 
criminal who happens not to have committed his first crime.”31 This 
image is powerful. Even driving a Mercedes while black is an 
identity performance where whiteness is the audition. I must 
demonstrate that I am not unwanted traffic.32 From these narratives, 
dominant whiteness influences whites to believe in egalitarian ideals 
 29. Id. at 225–26. 
 30. Id. at 226. 
 31. LEONARD STEINHORN & BARBARA DIGGS-BROWN, BY THE COLOR OF OUR SKIN: THE 
ILLUSION OF INTEGRATION AND THE REALITY OF RACE 40 (1999). 
 32. See John O. Calmore, The Law and Culture-Shift: Race and the Warren Court Legacy, 
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1106 (2002). 
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and to recognize racial inequality, but to refrain from assuming any 
accountability or responsibility for the translation of the ideals into 
reality. Whites fail even to acknowledge the consequences of not 
doing so.33 
II. BLACK PERFORMANCE OF RACE: SPINNING GOLD FROM STRAW 
The concept of black performance extends the exploration of 
“racializing identity.”34 According to Bryant Alexander, “to perform 
Blackness is in essence to perform an aspect of Americanness or a 
result of being Americanized—twisting and turning the script, 
applying it to the Black experience.”35 Within the academic world, 
Manthia Diawara characterizes “Black performance studies” as 
examining “several interrelated notions, among them that 
‘performance’ involves an individual or group of people interpreting 
an existing tradition reinventing themselves—in front of an audience, 
or public.”36 Moreover, “black agency in the U.S. involves the 
redefinition of the tools of Americanness.”37 Here, racial performance 
transgresses the bounds of race as category, and incorporates and 
activates race as consciousness. In this sense, racial performance as 
practice involves re-interpretation, re-invention, re-presentment, and 
re-definition of one’s racialized identity within the dynamic context 
of being American. The notion of “opportunity” is the primary 
tradition that drives black performance in these terms. 
Weak, formalized versions of opportunity, such as the civil rights 
legacy of equality of opportunity, can no longer carry the day. To 
advance social justice, black performance must demand a script that 
reflects a stronger concept of opportunity. For example, James Nickel 
and Iris Young speak of such an opportunity. For Nickel, 
 33. BUSH, supra note 28, at 226. 
 34. Bryant Keith Alexander, Racializing Identity: Performance, Pedagogy, and Regret, 4 
CULT. STUD.-CRITICAL METHODOLOGIES 12, 13 (2004). 
 35. Id. at 14. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. As Ruth Frankenberg recognizes, “notions of race are closely linked to ideas about 
legitimate ‘ownership’ of the nation, with ‘whiteness’ and ‘Americanness’ linked tightly 
together.” Ruth Frankenberg, Introduction: Local Whiteness, Localizing Whiteness to 
DISPLACING WHITENESS: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CRITICISM 1, 6 (Ruth Frankenberg 
ed., 1997). 
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opportunities are “states of affairs that combine the absence of 
insuperable obstacles with the presence of means—internal or 
external—that give one a chance of overcoming the obstacles that 
remain.”38 For Young, “opportunity is a concept of enablement rather 
than possession; it refers to doing more than having.”39 I tie this 
concept very much to my freedom; that is, I have opportunities if I 
am not constrained from exercising that freedom, from doing things. 
The focus is on the enabling conditions that permit me to do those 
things: “Evaluating social justice according to whether persons have 
opportunities, therefore, must involve evaluating not [simply] a 
distributive outcome but [also] the social structures that enable or 
constrain the individuals in relevant situations.”40 Black performance 
is fueled primarily by this notion of enabled opportunity that 
challenges and contests those structures and systems that constrain 
freedom. The freedom to do things proceeds from the absence of 
opportunity-denying circumstances.  
Performing blackness is neither romantic nor heroic. It is a 
struggle. While racial performance furthers agency, it is neither 
autonomous nor transcendent. Externally imposed racial 
categorization remains an important part of the script, because 
“[r]acial categories themselves—their vicissitudes and the contests 
over them—reflect the competing notions of history, peoplehood, and 
collective destiny by which power has been organized and contested 
on the American scene.”41 This organization and contestation play 
out within a framework of whiteness as audition. The political history 
of whiteness certainly bears on this framework. Matthew Jacobson 
summarizes this history: 
The saga of European immigration has long been held up as 
proof of the openness of American society, the benign and 
absorptive powers of American capitalism, and the robust 
health of American democracy. “Ethnic inclusion,” “ethnic 
mobility,” and “ethnic assimilation” on the European model set 
 38. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 26 (1990). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN 
IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 9 (1998). 
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the standard upon which “America,” as an ideal, is presumed 
to work; they provide the normative experience against which 
others are measured. But this pretty story suddenly fades once 
one recognizes how crucial Europeans’ racial status as “free 
white persons” was to their gaining entrance in the first place; 
how profoundly dependent their racial inclusion was upon the 
racial exclusion of others; how racially accented the native 
resistance was even to their inclusion for something over half a 
century; and how completely intertwined were the prospects of 
becoming American and becoming Caucasian. Racism now 
appears not anomalous to the working of American 
democracy, but fundamental to it.42 
Performing blackness is, in quite significant ways, an attempt to 
break free of this history, to outperform it, if you will. 
Given the fundamental features of historic and current racism, 
black performance constitutes “an individualized project of self-
examination—confirming membership without conforming to [those] 
performative mandates”43 of whiteness as audition. In performing 
blackness, I am claiming membership within the social group of other 
African-Americans without essentializing my representation of them. 
As Alexander observes, “[p]erforming race is ultimately performing 
self in the face of history and in the company of others—and 
negotiating the problems and pitfalls of claiming and maintaining 
membership.”44 Here, membership is at least dual: African-American 
and American. 
III. PERFORMANCE AS STATUS PROTEST: THE PLUS AT THE MARGIN 
I trace the beginning of performing racial identity to my 
matriculation in college. Prior to that, growing up in the black 
northwest section of Pasadena, being black was not the tight fit it 
would prove to be in Palo Alto.45 Shortly after the 1965 civil disorder 
 42. Id. at 12. 
 43. Alexander, supra note 34, at 25. 
 44. Id. 
 45. For elaboration, see John O. Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration Warrior, 81 
MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1453–55 (1997). This time at Stanford was over forty years ago, and 
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in Watts, I returned to Stanford University as a junior. In a sociology 
class that fall, I remember readings on the topic of “Class, Minority 
Status, and Minority Role.” I was finding myself (or at least looking 
for myself) in a very white setting, so I dug in attempting to come up 
with an effective, positive self-awareness that was not white-washed. 
The professor directed our attention to the following passage in our 
textbook: 
One of the defining characteristics of minority status is the 
self-awareness of minority group members. This would be 
quite similar to the notion of “consciousness-of-kind” for 
members of the same social class. Many sociologists of 
stratification hold that the working “class” is not really a class 
until its members develop (1) an explicit awareness of their 
class position and (2) the feeling of awareness that others 
around them share the same condition.46 
At that time, a significant number of black students were first 
generation middle-class, far less privileged than today’s black 
students at selective universities and colleges.47 Thus, in terms of race 
and class, many of us within the small but critical black mass were, if 
not a new race, certainly a new race presence. We regularly worked 
to manifest a consciousness-of-kind, as we became a “class,” as 
suggested in the quoted passage.  
Among the assigned readings in this sociology class was a seven-
page excerpt from an Everett Hughes essay.48 Herein lay the 
conscious beginnings of the racial odyssey, now forty years in the 
making, of John Otis Calmore, the marginal man engaged in status 
protest. Robert Park coined the phrase “marginal man” in his essay 
“Human Migration and the Marginal Man” in 1928.49 Park viewed 
the “marginal man” as a “function of the break-up and mixing of 
many who are familiar with the university’s exemplary diversity will find it hard to appreciate 
the isolation and rejection black students dealt with then. 
 46. Raymond W. Mack, Introduction: Chapter 8, in RACE, CLASS, AND POWER 252, 252–
53 (Raymond W. Mack ed., 1963). 
 47. BART LANDRY, THE NEW BLACK MIDDLE CLASS 86 (1987). 
 48. Everett C. Hughes, Social Change and Status Protest: An Essay on the Marginal Man, 
in RACE, CLASS, AND POWER, supra note 46, at 290. 
 49. Id. at 290. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol18/iss1/6
p  99 Calmore book pages.doc  10/18/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  Whiteness as Audition 113 
 
 
 
cultures attendant upon migration and the great cultural 
revolutions.”50 He was “one whom fate has condemned to live in two 
societies and in two, not merely different but antagonistic cultures.”51 
As if describing perfectly my predicament at Stanford, Park 
portrayed the emancipated man as one who is both “eager for new 
things” and “painfully homesick for that which he left behind.”52 As 
Hughes points out, he may long more intensely for that which may no 
longer exist.53 In my case, this was my place within the black 
community I had left behind. The community was physically there, 
but my place in it was gone.  
After beginning with the entirely emancipated man, Park moved 
on to the “cultural hybrid,” defined as: 
[A] man living and sharing intimately in the cultural life and 
traditions of two distinct peoples; never quite willing to break, 
even if he were permitted to do so, with his past and his 
traditions, and not quite accepted, because of racial prejudice, 
in the new society in which he now sought to find a place.54 
With regards to the true marginal position, Hughes argued that 
culture and race develop independently.55 Although a racial hybrid is 
ordinarily a cultural hybrid as well, in America this is not necessarily 
so.56 Tellingly, Hughes pointed to African-Americans as the primary 
example.57 Hughes said that, “whether of mixed blood or not,” 
African-Americans are not cultural hybrids.58 Nonetheless, we do 
inhabit a similar status dilemma; moreover, this dilemma becomes 
greater as African-Americans increasingly embrace elements of 
American culture.59 
 50. Id. 
 51. Robert Park, Introduction to EVERETT V. STONEQUIST, THE MARGINAL MAN: A 
STUDY IN PERSONALITY AND CULTURE CONFLICT vii, xv (1961). 
 52. Hughes, supra note 48, at 291. 
 53. Id. at 291. 
 54. Id. Park considered Jews to be the prototype “cultural hybrid,” while Hughes thought 
“the person of mixed blood . . . [to be] perhaps the most permanently and fatally condemned of 
all to the condition of marginality.” Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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Writing in the 1960s, Hughes claimed that “the American Negro 
is a living contradiction of the canons of status in the American 
culture.”60 I personified that living contradiction. According to 
Hughes, the contradiction is that a group, such as American Negroes, 
was assigned a limited status within American culture, yet possessed 
characteristics that would ordinarily allow the individual to achieve a 
higher status.61 The objective dilemma is that the individual can 
neither accept the “Negro” status assigned to him, nor free himself 
from it.62 The subjective dilemma lies in the fact that the individual 
who passes as white eliminates “any contradiction to the eyes of 
others,” but retains the internal dilemma.63 While I could never pass 
biologically, I can and do pass sociologically as part of a strategy of 
upward mobility. Psychologically, this is probably unhealthy.64 
Viewing status as a term of society that “refers specifically to a 
system of relations between people,”65 Hughes argued that status is 
actually defined by culture, and that one’s identification with a 
culture may be one of the “essential features of a person’s status.”66 
In American society at the time, a “mobile and changing society[,] 
new kinds of persons continually acquire[d] the technically and 
formally demanded skills or qualities of a profession, or other 
position. Whenever this happen[ed], sociological news [wa]s made 
and a new and unexpected combination of social characteristics 
appear[ed].”67 During my matriculation at Stanford from 1963–1967, 
black students there and at other elite colleges and universities were 
“new kinds of persons” in this very sense. Our growing presence on 
campuses and in other domains where we had been traditionally 
absent was discombobulating not only to us, but also to society. As 
William Banks notes: 
In 1966 a public opinion poll indicated that 85 percent of all 
white Americans felt that “the pace of civil rights progress was 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 292. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Calmore, supra note 45, at 1451–52. 
 65. Hughes, supra note 48, at 292. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol18/iss1/6
p  99 Calmore book pages.doc  10/18/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  Whiteness as Audition 115 
 
 
 
too fast.” As one twenty-two-year-old white woman put it, 
“They’re asking for too much all at once. They should try the 
installment plan. People don’t adjust that quickly.”68 
In assessing the marginal man, Hughes pointed out that these new 
people do not lack the socially expected characteristics of individuals 
in their newfound positions.69 Instead, we are simply viewed as 
members of groups positively possessing characteristics that do not 
match these positions.70 In my experience, we come into these 
positions with stereotypes of our groups that reflect the traditional 
roles assigned to them by society. We, the new people, do not so 
much represent blacks as we personify the exceptions that prove the 
rule. Hughes observed that these individuals are faced in certain 
situations with the dilemma of whether to act completely in their new 
role, or in their traditional group role.71 At that time and place, our 
culture, Hughes would argue, does not provide acceptable behavior 
protocol for various situations that may arise from the new role—
“[t]his is their dilemma.”72 Finally, Hughes distinguished between 
“that kind of protest which is merely a squirming within the harness, 
and that which is a questioning of the very terms and dimensions of 
the prevailing status definitions.”73 In actuality, I have experienced 
status protest as each of these separately, and both simultaneously. 
The social psychology of status protest is suggested in the work of 
Stonequist, who explains that through interactions with others, both 
conscious and unconscious, individuals recognize their place in the 
social world.74 Status protest stems from both the recognition of one’s 
 68. WILLIAM M. BANKS, BLACK INTELLECTUALS: RACE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN 
AMERICAN LIFE 149 (1996) (quoting WILLIAM BRINK & LEWIS HARRIS, BLACK AND WHITE: A 
STUDY OF U.S. RACIAL ATTITUDES TODAY 120 (1966)). 
 69. Hughes, supra note 48, at 293. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 297. Even in a “settled society,” one could always question the “terms and 
dimensions of the prevailing status definitions.” Id. Of course, our social mobility creates a 
greater and more intense status dilemma. I am not sure that change and mobility are necessary 
conditions of marginality. In fact, I would think not. However, they intensify the dilemma and 
make it more necessary to accept one’s marginal position in a positive way in order to lead a 
healthy existence. 
 74. STONEQUIST, supra note 51, at 1. 
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place and the rejection of its assigned parameters.75 Elements of one’s 
personality will be integrated with sentiments of one’s society, and 
one who is in accord with the social system will also have harmony 
in his personality, his sentiments, his aspirations, and his lifestyle.76 
For most whites, at least in terms of racial identity, life is relatively 
smooth sailing.77 Performance of race is really just a matter of an 
individual being one’s self, because his conception of himself will 
parallel the certainty of his group membership.78 Stonequist pointed 
out, however, that such a stable society could only exist in isolation.79 
According to Stonequist, the modern world (circa 1937 when he 
wrote) was characterized by uncertainty and change. As a result, the 
“individual who through migration, education, marriage, or some 
other influence leaves one social group or culture without making a 
satisfactory adjustment to another finds himself on the margin of each 
but a member of neither.”80 As a personality, one who is “unwittingly 
initiated into two or more historic traditions, languages, political 
loyalties, moral codes, or religions” personifies the marginal man.81 
In fact, “[w]herever there are cultural transitions and cultural 
conflicts there are marginal personalities.”82  
If the contrasts between the groups or cultures are sharp and the 
social attitudes are hostile, the conflicts and problems for the 
individual will be “acute.”83 According to Stonequist, the duality of 
this position does not always create a problem for the individual.84 
The individual can adjust to each group in which he participates, by 
showing to each a different side of himself.85 It is when two or more 
social groups come into active conflict that the individual experiences 
the conflict as an acute internal dilemma.86 The external conflict 
 75. Id. at 152. 
 76. Id. at 2. 
 77. McIntosh, supra note 1, at 28. 
 78. STONEQUIST, supra note 51, at 2. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 2–3. 
 81. Id. at 3. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 201. 
 85. Id. at 4. 
 86. Id. 
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between the groups is echoed by the internal conflict for the 
individual.87 During my matriculation at Stanford and at Harvard 
Law School, the external conflict between blacks and whites was 
stark in almost every way—culturally (black is beautiful; Afros), 
politically (black power), and socially (civil disorders and the 
assassinations of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, Jr.). Stonequist 
is precisely correct in discussing the echoing of external conflict 
within the personal experiences of those of us who were “the new 
people.” Banks observes with some understatement that “[f]or many 
black students and faculty, a white university environment presented 
special problems. Students had to contend with academic challenges 
while sorting out the meaning of their presence on campus—to 
themselves and to whites.”88 For many of us, during the mid-1960s 
and early 1970s, we went from representing King’s dream of a more 
open society and multiracial democracy to simply trying to survive. 
Uncomfortable at home, we were out of place away from it. 
Stonequist suggested that incorporation into the dominant culture, 
through assimilation or passing, may be a goal of those in marginal 
positions.89 He argued that where assimilation is possible, one may be 
able to shorten one’s time on the marginal stage.90 While European 
immigrants exemplify this process, racial marks, of course, determine 
the extent to which one is able to physically pass.91 For much of the 
nation’s history, race has been viewed as biological, and the 
distinguishing physical characteristics of blacks rendered them 
“unassimilable.”92  
It is also important to note, in relation to Hughes, the distinction 
Stonequist made between the social change that comes from “the 
gradual introduction of new ideas from within and without a given 
society, and the type of social change which results from the sudden 
 87. Id. 
 88. BANKS, supra note 68, at 173. Banks quotes a new faculty member at UCLA, who 
said, “When I arrived . . . after my Ph.D. I felt like a powerful shark, just cruising the waters. 
Now I feel like a wounded minnow, just trying to survive.” Id. 
 89. STONEQUIST, supra note 51, at 184. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 185. This does not, however, address sociological passing. 
 92. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF 
MEANING 219 (1993). 
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contact of two or more societies with different cultures.”93 According 
to Stonequist, in the latter situation, there is a more profound effect 
on the marginalized group that must do a greater share of adjusting.94 
While Park first posited the marginal man as a point of interest 
that could be studied in multi-cultural societies,95 Stonequist 
presented the marginal man as a more isolated individual who is seen 
by whites as inferior.96 This characterization of the marginal man in 
isolation continues to be employed in critical writing.97  
As subjects of exploration, constructive marginalization and status 
protest may benefit from adopting working concepts of collectivism98 
and racial and ethnic hybridity.99 Paul Meredith argues that the hybrid 
 93. STONEQUIST, supra note 51, at 216. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Park, supra note 51, at xv. 
 96. STONEQUIST, supra note 51, at 148–49. 
 97. For example, Stephanie Richardson highlights Stonequist’s isolated marginal man in 
her discussion about the challenges facing biracial children. See Stephanie R. Richardson, Note, 
Strict Scrutiny, Biracial Children, and Adoption, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 203, 206 (2002). A 
number of authors cite Stonequist simply to acknowledge the difficulty and duality of living as 
a minority in American society, much like the burdens of Du Bois’s double-consciousness. See, 
e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?: Assimilation and the Mexican-
American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1263 n.7 (1997). The term “marginal man” has 
also been used to refer to Asian-Americans, as they are positioned between white and black. See 
Keith Aoki, Direct Democracy, Racial Group Agency, Local Government Law, and Residential 
Racial Segregation, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 92, 185 n.27 (1997); Janine Young Kim, Are Asians 
Black?: The Asian-American Civil Rights Agenda and the Contemporary Significance of the 
Black/White Paradigm, 108 YALE L.J. 2385, 2397 (1999). Overall, the marginal man is 
mentioned only briefly in most of these pieces in order to refer to some kind of dual identity. 
There is very little elaboration on the theory of the marginal man. Certainly, no one seems to be 
positing that those who inhabit the margin should embrace it as a possible remedy for the 
conflict associated with marginality and status protest. In the context of multi-racial individuals, 
some have challenged Stonequist’s model of the condemned individual with models of positive 
development for biracial people. See Patrick F. Linehan, Thinking Outside the Box: The 
Multiracial Category and its Implications For Race Identity Development, 44 HOW. L.J. 43, 71 
(2000). These models suggest that multiracial individuals can develop in a healthy way despite 
the potential for internal conflict. These models might be adapted to suit the “cultural hybrid.” 
 98. Daphna Oyserman et al., Cultural Accommodation: Hybridity and the Framing of 
Social Obligation, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1606, 1607 (1998). 
 99. May Joseph, Introduction: New Hybrid Identities and Performance to PERFORMING 
HYBRIDITY 1, 5 (May Joseph & Jennifer Natalya Fink eds., 1999) (“In the post–civil rights era, 
hybridity emerges as a democratic expression of multiple affiliations of cultural citizenship in 
the United States.”). While further development of this point is beyond the scope of this essay, 
future work could explore the potential to engage in status protest through these concepts. 
 According to the University of Canterbury’s GLOSSARY OF SOCIOLOGICAL TERMS,  
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identity, operating from a “third space,” is positioned as a “‘lubricant’ 
in the conjunction of cultures.”100 Much post-colonial scholarship 
suggests that the hybrid individual lives the experience and possesses 
the knowledge of “transculturation” that enables one to “transverse 
both cultures and to translate, negotiate and mediate affinity and 
difference within a dynamic of exchange and inclusion.”101 The 
hybrid identity performs with a counter-hegemonic agency: “[a]t the 
point at which the coloniser presents a normalising, hegemonic 
practice, the hybrid strategy opens up a third space of/for 
rearticulation of negotiation and meaning.”102 By initiating “new 
signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration and 
contestation,”103 third-space hybridity performance may open the 
door to a new day, moving us beyond the racial impasse to racial 
progress. At the very least, it may help us to better negotiate the 
challenges described in the next part of this essay. 
IV. DIASPORA IDENTITY AND BLACK PERFORMANCE—THE 
DIVERSITY WITHIN: THE BARACK OBAMA CHALLENGE  
Performing black identity is increasingly complex when issues of 
immigration and race intersect.104 The newly-elected senator from 
[h]ybridity refers principally to the creation of dynamic mixed cultures. Sociologists 
and anthropologists, who use the expression “syncretism” to refer to such phenomena, 
have long observed the evolution of commingled cultures from two or more parent 
cultures. Using the literature and other cultural expressions of colonial peoples, . . . . 
[some scholars view] hybridity as a transgressive act challenging the colonizers’ 
authority, values and representations and thereby constituting an act of self-
empowerment and defiance. 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY, GLOSSARY OF SOCIOLOGICAL TERMS, available at 
http://www.soci.canterbury.ac.nz/resources/glossary/hybridit.shtml (last visited Oct. 8, 2005). 
 100. Paul Meredith, Hybridity in the Third Space: Rethinking Bi-cultural Politics in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand, 4 HE PUKENGA KORENO 12, 15 (1999) (citation omitted), available at 
http://lianz.waikato.ac.nz/PAPERS/paul/hybridity.pdf. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. (citation omitted). 
 104. See MARY C. WATERS, BLACK IDENTITIES: WEST INDIAN IMMIGRANT DREAMS AND 
AMERICAN REALITIES 185, 285 (1999) (arguing that black immigrants have succeeded without 
strict assimilatory behavior, constructing both whites and African-Americans as “other”); see 
also Kristin F. Butcher, Black Immigrants in the United States, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 
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Illinois, Barack Obama, is the new face of race. He has a black father 
from Kenya, a white mother from Kansas, and was raised by 
maternal grandparents in Hawaii.105 He is viewed quite favorably in 
terms of the oppositional dualities enumerated above by Melanie 
Bush.106 He is often described in the media as reflecting a viewpoint 
and image that whites associate with themselves but not with native-
born African-Americans—he is viewed as “multicultural, realistic, 
relevant, open-minded, caring, educated, and honest.”107 He performs 
his identity almost to perfection. Observing Obama’s campaign, 
William Finnegan wrote: 
Obama’s ease in front of predominantly white crowds—or, for 
that matter, all-white crowds—is a source of wonderment in 
Illinois. I’ve seen it, and it looks so effortless that it doesn’t 
seem remarkable. The sight of big white corn farmers proudly 
wearing big blue ‘OBAMA’ buttons and lining up to shake his 
hand is, I must say, slightly more striking.108 
Simultaneously, Obama projects a dual image of an African-
American and of something else that is black, but not African-
American. The immigrant side of this dual identity projects a 
favorable image. As Noam Scheiber argues, “apart from charisma, 
what makes Obama such a strong candidate outside the black 
community is precisely his exotic (and unthreatening) background—
everything that serves to differentiate him from what white voters 
might see as stereotypically African American.”109 However, Obama 
identifies himself as African-American,110 expanding a putative 
solidarity between native and immigrant blacks. Establishing and 
maintaining solidarity is the challenge for the black diaspora in the 
United States. While some immigrant blacks emphasize their social 
265, 268–75 (1994) (analyzing differences in labor market participation between native and 
immigrant blacks). 
 105. BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND INHERITANCE 
9–16 (paperback ed. 2004). 
 106. See BUSH, supra note 28, and accompanying text. 
 107. Id. at 226; see also supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 108. William Finnegan, The Candidate: How the Son of a Kenyan Economist Became an 
Illinois Everyman, 80 NEW YORKER 32, 35 (May 31, 2004). 
 109. Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
 110. OBAMA, supra note 105, at vii. 
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distance from native blacks, Obama is comfortable with being 
categorized as an African-American, explaining: 
The reason that I’ve always been comfortable with that 
description is not a denial of my mother’s side of the 
family. . . . Rather, it’s just a belief that the term African-
American is by definition a hybrid term. African-Americans 
are . . . . mingled with African culture and Native American 
culture and European culture . . . . If I was arrested for armed 
robbery and my mug shot was on the television screen, people 
wouldn’t be debating if I was African-American or not. I’d be 
a black man going to jail. Now if that’s true when bad things 
are happening, there’s no reason why I shouldn’t be proud of 
being a black man when good things are happening, too.111 
Some have expressed concern, however, that black immigrants are 
displacing African-Americans, the descendents of American slavery, 
when it comes to accessing positions of power, position, and prestige. 
The potential is great for black immigrants from Africa and the 
Caribbean, particularly, to push against African-Americans at both 
the bottom and the top. 
The issue of displacement was recently highlighted by an event at 
Harvard University. At a gathering of black alumni, professors Lani 
Guinier and Henry Louis Gates raised the issue in the context of 
black students attending Harvard.112 They reported that “[w]hile 
about 8 percent, or about 530, of Harvard’s undergraduates are black 
. . . the majority of them—perhaps as many as two-thirds—are West 
Indian and African immigrants or their children, or to a lesser extent, 
children of biracial couples.”113  
Placing the matter in a larger analytical framework, Mary Waters 
argued that the manner in which the nation incorporates a people into 
its social and cultural structure, along with their subsequent 
treatment, influences our understanding of conflict and cooperation 
 111. William Bunch, Who the Heck is This Guy?, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, July 27, 2004, at 3, 
4. 
 112. Sara Rimer & Karen W. Arenson, Top Colleges Take More Blacks, But Which Ones?, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004, at A1, A18. 
 113. Id. at A1. 
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among racial and ethnic groups.114 She cited the following aspects of 
that understanding, at both individual and group levels: 
1. The meanings attached to racial and ethnic identities: are 
these oppositional identities, immigrant identities, or 
symbolic identities? 
2. The relationship of the group and its component individuals 
to the state: do they trust the institutions of the state to be 
fair and honest? Do they see systematic oppression, and the 
power of the state exercised against them, or do they see the 
state as an instrument of power to be used by their own 
group or as a neutral arbiter among groups? 
3. The meanings attached to incidents of hate crimes, 
violence, and intergroup encounters: are they perceived as 
temporary, accidental and individualized, or as permanent, 
systematic, and institutionalized?115 
Among blacks, this presents a topic of vigorous debate and raises 
some larger issues about racial progress: how we name it, how we 
measure it, how we push for it. Immigrants of color—black, brown, 
and yellow—seem generally to emphasize an ethnic theory of 
progress, while African-Americans seem to emphasize a racial theory 
of progress. Race conscious collectivism is terribly threatened. I 
believe the potential for people of color to accommodate themselves 
uncritically to a bad system, institution, or culture is wedded to this 
ethnic identification. Even though immigrants from Asia, Central and 
Latin America, Africa, and the Caribbean are racialized, they may 
ultimately reinforce white ethnic theories of progress that have ill-
served African-Americans in the past. 
For example, these immigrants may reinforce white ethnic notions 
of making it in America. This packaged notion features a self-
limiting account of the European history of assimilation, which 
emphasizes self-sacrifice by early generations on behalf of later ones, 
 114. Mary C. Waters, Ethnic and Racial Groups in the USA: Conflict and Cooperation, in 
ETHNICITY AND POWER IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 236, 236 (Kumar Rupesinghe & 
Valery A. Tishkov eds., 1996). 
 115. Id. at 236–37. 
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individual mobility and opportunity, and perhaps informal ethnic 
cooperation among members of the group.116 However, there is no 
salient racial identity, group consciousness, or collective orientation. 
Will racialized ethnic groups of color yield to the incessant tide of 
assimilation? Will these identities fit well with American 
individualism, which emphasizes individual inclinations and tastes 
rather than social or racial attachments?  
In studying black immigration in New York City, Waters 
concluded that Caribbean immigrants have a complex relationship 
with their new American identities:  
Most of them try to distance themselves from American 
blacks. They emphasize their own cultural and ethnic identity 
which distinguishes them from American blacks. They declare 
that Jamaicans and American blacks are different groups with 
different values, customs, traditional foods, dialects, and so on. 
They also point to the different reactions and relations with 
whites foreign-born blacks and American blacks have.117  
Moreover, along with identity differences, immigrant perceptions 
and reactions to racism may differ from those of native American 
blacks: 
West Indians generally do not expect racism and racist 
reactions from whites to the same extent as American blacks. 
West Indians tend to be more open to whites and more 
oblivious to racial slights. They have grown up in societies 
where the majority of people are blacks: as a result they have 
had less personal experience with racism of the kind that 
American blacks have encountered all their lives. Thus they 
expect less racism and interpret most interactions with whites 
as owing to their own individual characteristics rather than to 
their racial characteristics. They describe the American blacks 
as hypersensitive to issues of race, while the American blacks 
 116. The Jewish historical experience illustrates this notion; Jews progressed from outsider 
ethnics to probationary whites to accepted Caucasians. JACOBSON, supra note 41, at 171–99. 
 117. Waters, supra note 114, at 240 (citations omitted). 
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describe the foreign-born blacks as naïve in their acceptance of 
whites.118 
I realize that these observations invite debate. Some claim that I 
inappropriately endorse an oppression sweepstakes, or a race to the 
bottom; that I should emphasize shared values and interests that 
support coalition building; that I fail to take into account nuances, 
such as generational factors, occupational and professional factors, 
and income factors; and that I fail to unlink racialized immigrants 
from European immigrants, understating the salience of racism in the 
lived experiences of the former. 
I know, however, that white society tends to lump together all 
members of the African diaspora as outsiders to America. We 
respond on our best days in ways that promote a common racial 
identity, uniting us on the bases of skin color, historical African roots, 
and shared aspects of our histories as objects (victims) of racism 
linked to European colonialism, the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and 
slavery. Identity performance, however, may differ among members 
of different diaspora groups. Solidarity cannot be taken for granted. 
According to Richard Alba: 
The thrust of European-American identity is to defend the 
individualistic view of the American system, because it 
portrays the system as open to those who are willing to work 
hard and pull themselves over barriers of poverty and 
discrimination. Recent attitudinal research suggests that it is 
precisely this individualism that prevents many whites from 
sympathizing with the need for African Americans to receive 
 118. Id. Over time, however, the divergence between black immigrants and African-
Americans lessened. In her later study of West Indian immigrants, Waters pointed out that they 
came to the United States expecting structural racism (i.e., “blocked mobility for blacks in the 
society and a hierarchy in which whites have political and economic power”), but not 
interpersonal racism. WATERS, supra note 104, at 153. Over time, the experience of both kinds 
of racism leads the immigrants to resemble African-Americans and their approach to race 
relations also changes. Id. According to Waters, “[t]he immigrants’ experiences with racial 
incidents undermine and change their initial confidence that they will not become ‘racial’ in the 
United States . . . . [T]he longer they are here, the more they learn to see race operating in 
interactions where they would not have suspected it when they first arrived.” Id. at 189. 
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affirmative action in order to overcome institutional barriers to 
their advancement.119  
Will black immigrants adopt a similar thrust to their identity? 
To counter this thrust, African-Americans should consciously 
adopt features of the diaspora identity. I began to do this in 
September of 2001, when I attended the World Conference Against 
Racism in Durban, South Africa.120 Each morning there was a 
Diaspora Caucus, and for the first time I began to emphasize shared 
history, values, and orientations with blacks from around the world. I 
began to think of myself in terms of diaspora hybridity. Building on 
the work of Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy, Matthews examined the 
diasporic hybridity of Asian and Eurasian females and declared that 
“it is important to think not only of ‘rooted’ diasporic histories, but 
processes by which these have been ‘routed’ in distinct and 
intersecting ways.”121 The rooting and routing features she described 
are seldom joined in the identity performance of native-born 
American blacks. Yet the potential to adopt this identity is the Barack 
Obama challenge. As Hall said, “[t]he diaspora experience . . . . is 
defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a 
necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of ‘identity’ 
which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by 
hybridity.”122 While assuming an identity, whatever the features, does 
not thereby establish links and solidarities, we blacks must certainly 
pay more attention to the possibilities and contestations that confront 
us, as black and African-American are not necessarily synonymous 
and may not mean the same throughout the country. The diaspora 
identity, on the other hand, creates room on the increasingly crowded 
stage of black racial performance. In Hall’s view, “[d]iaspora 
identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing 
themselves anew, through transformation and difference.”123 
 119. RICHARD D. ALBA, ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF WHITE AMERICA 
317 (1990). 
 120. United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance. For more information on this conference, see 
http://www.un.org/WCAR. 
 121. Matthews, supra note 17, ¶ 18. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
In January of 2005, there was an unusual exhibit at the 
International Center of Photography, entitled “White: Whiteness and 
Race in Contemporary Art.”124 This exhibit was unusual because 
references to race are usually not centered on whiteness; in 
contemporary art, one expects the subject of race to center on non-
whites. According to Maurice Berger’s introduction to the show, 
“[i]n mainstream American society and culture, whiteness remains an 
ever-present state of mind and body, a powerful norm so pervasive 
that it is rarely acknowledged or even named.”125 This awareness 
directs whiteness studies that reflect, in part, the emphasis of the 
exhibit, which focused on contemporary artists deliberately 
examining racial myths and constructs.126 
If I were white, I would welcome this exhibit. I would want to 
engage in the critical study of whiteness and its racial identity 
formation, white privilege, and the need to examine what this means 
in relation to others, both white and non-white. This undertaking 
would attempt to unmask white privilege and reveal what is hidden 
within a white social psychology that discounts the racialized realities 
of being white. Even within a world of normative color-blindness, 
race matters too much and not enough; never just right.  
As with the photography exhibit, in this essay I have tried to 
examine whiteness beyond myth. More particularly, I have looked at 
whiteness as a relational concept that directs the identity performance 
of non-whites. How does identity performance play out for people of 
color like me, who are sufficiently free from the most severe racial 
constraints? For us, race issues prescribe our interaction with and 
relation to whites in non-traditional settings and circumstances that 
are white dominant, but not exclusively so. As putative peers, what 
does “their whiteness” mean for “my blackness”? As putative peers, 
must we be racially similar for me to meet their comfort levels and 
expectations of suitability or merit? And if I do not approximate 
 124. Margo Jefferson, Playing on Black and White: Racial Messages Through a Camera 
Lens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2005, at B1. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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racial similarity to whites, what risks of marginalization will I 
encounter? Must I wear a mask that resembles me in order to pretend 
to be me?  
Performing racialized identity is tricky and messy. For blacks it 
should not mean that the quid pro quo for dignity, respect, 
acceptance, and enabled opportunity is assimilatory behavior. Until 
we are able to strike a better bargain, the social contract will remain 
an unconscionable one. While whites focus on dismantling white 
privilege, people of color must not reinforce white privilege through 
our attachment to it.  
All of us—native born and immigrant—must re-negotiate the 
script, direction, and production of the American drama. For this to 
occur, a truly open society and multiracial democracy must 
incorporate people of color, rather than assimilate them. 
Incorporation requires dominant white society, as the host society, to 
accommodate people of color in new ways. According to David Theo 
Goldberg, the principle of incorporation “involves the dual 
transformations that take place in the dominant values and those of 
the insurgent group as the latter insists on more complete 
incorporations into the body politic and the former gives way.”127  
Those of us who press for incorporation should not accept the 
mere extension of dominant values and protections that may accrue to 
us as individualized, integrated tokens. We must not reify bad 
relations that allow us to enter the doors of opportunity while shutting 
out most of our own social groups. As conceived here, incorporation 
is an attempt to establish an open society. The body politic, the 
cultural habits, the societal organization, and the institutional 
arrangements would become means for transformation and domains 
for strategic contestation. From within pockets of relative privilege, 
performing our non-white identity must seek incorporation in a 
manner that undermines and alters what is, in Goldberg’s view, “the 
dominant, controlling, confining, and periphrastic values of the 
culturally dominant.”128 As Goldberg has explained, “incorporative 
 127. Calmore, supra note 45, at 1472 n.138 (quoting David Theo Goldberg, Introduction: 
Multicultural Conditions to MULTICULTURALISM: A CRITICAL READER 1, 9 (David Theo 
Goldberg ed., 1994)). 
 128. Id. at 1478 n.142. 
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undertakings are transgressive, engaged by definition in infringing 
and exceeding the norms of the monocultural status quo and 
transforming the values and representations that have held racist 
culture together.”129  
The call of the day is for insurgent incorporators. Performing 
one’s racialized identity should begin here. Where it goes from there 
is not simply anyone’s guess, it is where we take it. Whites, too, must 
be subject to audition, an audition of humanity that connects us all. I 
end, then, with the insight of Patricia Williams: 
With regard to all these configurations, let me just say that I 
am certain that the solution to racism lies in our ability to see 
its ubiquity but not to concede its inevitability. It lies in the 
collective and institutional power to make change, at least as 
much with the individual will to change. It also lies in the 
absolute moral imperative to break the childish, deadly 
circularity of centuries of blindness to the shimmering 
brilliance of our common, ordinary humanity.130  
 129. Id. at 1478 n.143. Goldberg sees this as a consequence in which hybridity establishes 
multicultural conditions that promote new domains of knowledge and new representative 
subjects. Id. 
 130. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 68. 
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